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TRUST MODELS FOR REMOTE ELECTRONIC VOTING 
Melanie Volkamer 1, Rüdiger Grimm 2
Abstract – System security requirements are supplemented by the underlying trust 
model containing assumptions on the operational environment and the intruder’s 
technical capability . This is also respected by the Common Criteria and in 
particular its Protection Profile (PP) construct. Consequently, systems being 
compliant with a particular PP run securely only under the defined trust model. 
Therefore, a realistic description of the underlying trust model is very important. 
This holds particularly for critical applications like remote electronic voting. A 
respective Protection Profile has been certified in these days, the so called 
GI/BSI/DFKI PP. Some readers argue that some of the assumptions defined by 
this PP are not realistic in practice. Therefore, this paper discusses the 
consequences for the system design when changing the GI/BSI/DFKI PP trust 
model. In particular, the paper focuses on the assumptions that vote casting 
devices are trustworthy and the intruder’s technical capability that cryptographic 
keys cannot be broken. 
1. Introduction 
Remote electronic voting systems are more and more used – not so much for parliamentary 
elections, but for elections on lower levels, for example in associations and at universities. A 
basis for the evaluation and certification of system security is laid by the Protection Profile [1] 
recently developed in Germany. Over the last two years, the Gesellschaft für Informatik (GI) 
has developed a Protection Profile (PP) for a basic set of security requirements for remote 
electronic voting systems [1] in cooperation with the German Federal Office for Information 
Security (BSI) and the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI). This 
GI/BSI/DFKI Protection Profile is based on the Common Criteria (CC) [2] and serves as basis 
for a standardised evaluation. It defines a minimum set of security objectives which every 
remote electronic voting system has to ensure (at least) and a maximised underlying trust 
model. According to the CC principles a remote electronic voting system certified against this 
GI/BSI/DFKI PP assures a secret, free, equal and universal election only under the condition 
that the system is used in an environment where the defined trust model holds. This trust 
model comprises a maximal set of security requirements for the environment of a system as 
well as a realistic estimation of the intruder’s capabilities. The Common Criteria defines the 
trust model mainly in the security problem definition section of a Protection Profile. 
A typical problem of the PP specification is the decision about the place of a security 
objective; either as a security objective for the system to be evaluated or as a security 
objective for the environment the evaluated system is used in. In general, the smaller the 
kernel of system security objectives, the richer becomes the trust model. The GI/BSI/DFKI 
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PP addresses only a “basic set of security requirements”, consequently the defined trust model 
is critical, that is, the set of assumptions on the environment and the intruders’ capability can 
be suspected to be unrealistic. Note, it is important that the trust model definition fits to the 
situation in which the remote electronic voting system is operated. If the corresponding trust 
model causes unsolvable constraints then the election authority must not implement remote 
electronic voting systems even if they are evaluated to be “secure”. Reason: they are only 
secure in an environment which the election authority cannot provide. 
From this point of view, this paper discusses first the importance of trust models in the 
context of remote electronic voting and in particular for the evaluation of related voting 
systems. We propose different implementation forms of two issues of the trust model, and we 
will discuss the consequences for the developer of a remote electronic voting system. The 
paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we explain how the complexity of secure systems 
is reduced by the implementation of a trust model about an environment. Section 3 and 4 
discuss two exemplary modifications of the trust model and their consequences for the 
required security functions. In section 3, this is done with respect to the security objective for 
the environment that vote casting devices are trustworthy and in section 4, with respect to the 
implicitly assumption that an intruder is not able to decrypt votes. Finally, section 5 draws 
conclusions for the definition of the trust model. 
2. Trust Models versus Secure Systems 
Ideally, remote electronic voting systems are technically equipped in such a way that they 
enforce all security requirements. Then they would run securely in any environment, 
especially in insecure environments. In fact, real environments including uneducated voters, 
public-domain browsers, standard operating systems and unprotected open networks are 
naturally insecure. Theoretically, corresponding strong system security requirements can be 
specified. Unfortunately, developing a system in compliance with so strong system 
requirements is difficult, if not unfeasible. Moreover, such a system would become very 
complex because it would contain many more components than the pure voting protocol. It is 
likely that it would be too complex to be evaluated in reasonable time and under acceptable 
costs. This problem holds not only for electronic voting systems, but in general. Therefore, 
the idea is to put some constraints on the operational environment and to demand that it is not 
completely insecure. However, the assumptions about the environment and the intruder’s 
capabilities must be specified explicitly. This concept is supported by the Common Criteria’s 
“security problem definition” in combination with the definition of the “intruder’s capability” 
by the four attacker potential values: basic, enhanced-basic, moderate, and high. Depending 
on the environment and the importance of the election (and thus, the expected intruders), 
some of the defined threats can completely, or in parts, be encountered by corresponding 
assumptions on the operational environment. According to the Common Criteria, the 
respective security objectives of the system can be shifted to security objectives of the 
environment. This operation can dramatically reduce the complexity of the system. On the 
basis of a remote voting system which is evaluated to comply with a Protection Profile of this 
type, the election authority in charge has to decide whether or not the defined assumptions can 
be realised by their environment. The same holds for the assumed intruder capability.  
Therefore, the list of assumptions may vary with the type of elections. The decision whether 
security objectives are related to the system or to the environment is a decision about the 
complexity of the system security requirements versus the complexity of the trust model. 
Obviously, this decision has consequences for the system design and complexity. In the 
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following section we are going to discuss these consequences for two examples in the context 
of remote electronic voting. 
3. Assumption of a Trustworthy Vote Casting Device 
In an ideal word, a Protection Profile for remote electronic voting would contain the 
following security objective for the remote electronic voting system (shortcut with 
O.TamperClient). It needs to be ensured (in an ideal world) and is deduced from a 
corresponding threat (shortcut T.TamperClient): 
 
O.TamperClient: The client-side voting software shall ensure that its operations and data are 
unaffected by other applications running on the vote casting device. 
 
T.TamperClient: An outside intruder runs malware on the vote casting device, which reads 
the vote (in order to break election secrecy), or alters the vote, or reads the 
authentication information to cast a vote or to bar the voter from casting a vote (in 
order to affect the election result). 
 
Now, the election authority needs to define their particular trust model and, thus, decides 
whether this corresponding threat is already prevented by the environment (according to the 
GI/BSI/DFKI PP), does not exist in their scenario at all3, or has to be prevented by the remote 
electronic voting system (thus O.TamperClient holds). Depending on the decision, the 
following three cases can be distinguished: 
 
Case 1: The responsible election authority can assume that voters use a trustworthy vote 
casting device. This could be the case, for instance, for staff and council work elections where 
all PCs are centrally administered and secured. On this type of vote casting devices, the voter 
(or any other intruder) has no possibility of installing malware on purpose and the 
administrator can implement adequate security mechanisms on the PCs and can ensure that all 
running applications do not interfere with the client-side voting software. For this case, the 
named threat can be reformulated to a corresponding assumption (on connectivity aspects) to 
the environment: 
 
A.TamperClient: The vote casting device is trustworthy. 
According to the Common Criteria, the security objective itself is adjusted that it does not 
need to be ensured by the client-side voting software but by the environment (use OE instead 
of O): 
OE.TamperClient: The administrator(s) of the vote casting device is responsible for its 
trustworthiness, that is, ensuring that other applications running on the vote casting 
device do not interfere with the client-side voting software, its operations, and its data 
as well as preventing any intruder from running malware on the vote casting device 
which interferes with the client-side voting software, its operation, and its data. 
Consequences: The developer of a remote electronic voting system can assume a trustworthy 
vote casting device and does not need to implement any security functions to protect the 
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client-side voting software. However, such a remote electronic voting system enables secure 
elections only if the assumption holds for the client-side voting software, that is, if the 
administrator successfully secures the vote casting device. 
Case 2: The responsible election authority assumes no particular attack (as described in 
T.TamperClient) on their election. A possible reason for such a decision can be that the effort 
to implement such specific malware is too much effort compared with the value of the 
election. Thus, the property for the appearance of the threat is negligible. However, it is well-
known that various kinds of malware are available and many vote casting devices are already 
infected. Such malware usually tries to interfere with e-banking applications or, in general, to 
get user logins and corresponding passwords. To handle this remaining part of 
T.TamperClient, either a corresponding assumption of the environment needs to be defined 
(case 2A) or this part of the threat remained (case 2B): 
Case 2A: The following two assumptions can be distinguished: 
A.TamperClientA: Any intruder does not try to run remote electronic voting specific malware 
on the vote casting device which interferes with the client-side voting software, its 
operation, or its data. 
A.TamperClientB: The vote casting device is trustworthy with respect to standard 
vulnerabilities. 
The corresponding security objectives for the environment are: 
OE.TamperClientA: A remote electronic voting specific malware which interferes with the 
client-side voting software, its operation, or its data does not exist on the vote casting 
device. 
OE.TamperClientB: The voter is responsible for the trustworthiness of his vote casting 
device with respect to standard vulnerabilities. 
Consequences: The developer of a remote electronic voting system can assume a trustworthy 
vote casting device and does not need to implement any security functions to protect the 
client-side voting software. However, such a remote electronic voting system enables secure 
elections only if the assumption holds for the client-side voting software, that is, remote 
electronic voting specific malware does not exist and the voter secures his vote casting device 
against standard vulnerabilities. To do so, he must have the ability to secure his vote casting 
device. Thus, the responsible election authority shall help voters to clean their vote casting 
devices from such malware. The GI, for instance, applies for their elections a simplified 
voters’ guide [3], which contains one page of general hints and thirteen easy-to-follow one-
sentence rules for voters.  
Case 2B: Compared with case 2A, the security problem definition contains only the first 
assumption, while the second assumption is replaced by a threat:  
A.TamperClient: Any intruder does not try to run remote electronic voting specific malware 
on the vote casting device which interferes with the client-side voting software, its 
operation, or its data. 
T.TamperClient: An outside intruder uses standard malware on the vote casting device, 
which reads the vote (in order to break election secrecy), or alters the vote, or reads the 
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authentication information to cast a vote or to bar the voter from casting a vote (in 
order to affect the election result).  
From this assumption and threat, the following security objective for the environment and for 
the TOE can be deduced: 
OE.TamperClient: Remote electronic voting specific malware which interferes with the 
client-side voting software, its operation, or its data does not exist on the vote casting 
device.  
O.TamperClient: The client-side voting software shall be robust against standard 
vulnerabilities of vote casting device. 
Consequences: The developer of a remote electronic voting system cannot assume anymore 
that their client-side voting software runs on a completely trustworthy vote casting device but 
must be aware that standard vulnerabilities still exist. Thus, the developer must demonstrate 
that he implements the corresponding security functionality. 
Case 3: The responsible election authority considers the vote casting devices as open systems 
and assumes that voters are not able to protect themselves efficiently against malware. 
Moreover, from their point of view, it cannot be excluded that a malicious voter manipulates 
his vote casting device on purpose, in order to generate a proof of his choice, since a platform 
owner has complete control over it. Thus, the security problem definition remains as proposed 
in the very beginning of section 3. 
Consequences: In this case, T.TamperClient produces a serious problem because malicious 
code can be distributed easily and automatically, for example, by exploiting security flaws of 
the vote casting device or by sending infected e-mails to voters, which could be done 
massively via viruses. Malicious code could also be put on the vote casting device by 
developers of products running on many vote casting devices (for example, Solitair). 
Compared to postal voting, this attack can be done automatically and in large-scale with 
significant impact on the election result. However, common cryptographic means do not 
overcome any of these two attacks, since malicious code can interact before the cryptographic 
operations are applied. The intruder may, for instance, eavesdrop on mouse or keyboard 
inputs and deduce the voter’s choice. Different approaches for overcoming the weaknesses of 
the vote casting device have been proposed in the past, while most of them address the 
problem but do not satisfactorily solve it: 
• The GI guidelines [3] explaining to voters how to improve the trustworthiness of their 
vote casting device: This approach can reduce the risks created by malware, but many 
voters are not likely to be able to follow the instructions. Moreover, such an approach is 
useless against malicious voters installing malware on purpose.  
• Otten proposes in [4] a special voting operating system based on Knoppix. Here, voters 
have to boot their vote casting device from CD. This approach also does not solve the 
malicious voter problem, but it prevents attacks caused by malware.  
• [5] and [6] proposes the application of an observer, for instance, a smart card. By doing 
so, they overcome most of the attacks from malicious voters. However, a smart card does 
not interact directly with the voting server but over the vote casting device. Malware on 
this device can mount a man-in-the-middle attack and misuse the card, for instance, by 
sending a modified vote to the smart card. 
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• Helbach et. al propose in [9] (and the later improved version [10]) the code sheets to 
overcome the problem with malicious clients. This code sheet is sent via ordinary mail 
and contains for each candidate a voting TAN and a confirmation TAN4. The voter enters 
a corresponding voting TAN instead of choosing a candidate on the PC screen. To verify 
the correctness, he compares the received and displayed confirmation TAN with the one 
on the code sheet. The disadvantages of this approach concerns the user-friendliness 
(which decreases in particular for complex ballots implementing) and the fact that the 
requirement O.T.ProofGen can only be ensured if re-voting is applied. 
• Another approach proposes to use an appropriate security architecture based on a security 
kernel and on Trusted Computing elements. Such a solution is the only one that could 
efficiently prevent the described threat. However, currently, there are still open problems 
with Trusted Computing and it is not easy to know how to integrate the Trusted 
Computing elements in a Common Criteria evaluation. For a more detailed discussion of 
this case and in particular the Trusted Computing based approach, see [9] and [10]. 
This short analysis shows that currently defining only a security objective for the TOE with 
respect to the client weakness would avoid the application of remote electronic voting 
systems because the only approach meeting the security objective is not yet implemented and 
ready for a large-scale application, such as in an election.  
4. The Intruders’ Capability to Break Encryption Keys 
Depending on the concrete definition of the trust model in terms of the intruder’s capabilities, 
the following security objective in the PP is difficult to meet: 
O.ElecSecrecyNet: The remote electronic voting system shall not provide any information in 
transmitted protocol messages, which allow one to construct the link between a 
particular voter and his vote. 
T.ElecSecrecyNet: An outside intruder reads on the network in order to break the election 
secrecy. 
With respect to this security objective, the responsible election authority needs to decide ... 
Case 1 ... whether it is acceptable that the intruder is able to break the election secrecy after a 
particular point in time (for instance, after the next election). The consequence is that the 
named threat needs to be extended in the following way: 
T.ElecSecrecyNet: An outside intruder reads on the network in order to break the election 
secrecy before the next election. 
A similar extension needs to be added to the security objective:  
O.ElecSecrecyNet: The remote electronic voting system shall not provide any information in 
transmitted protocol messages, which allow one to construct the link between a 
particular voter and his vote before the next election. 
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Case 2 ... whether it is acceptable that the intruder is able to break the election secrecy (either 
before or after the next election) as long as he cannot prove the link. The consequence is that 
the named threat needs to be changed in the following way:  
T.ElecSecrecyNet: An outside intruder reads on the network in order to break the election 
secrecy and is able to prove the link between the voter and his vote.  
A similar modification needs to be added to the security objective: 
O.ElecSecrecyNet: The remote electronic voting system shall not provide any information in 
transmitted protocol messages, which allow one to construct the proof for the link 
between a particular voter and his vote. 
Case 3 ... whether only those remote electronic voting systems are acceptable, which ensure 
that the voter can never be linked to his vote by an outside intruder reading on the network 
(this would be in compliance with the temporal unlimited election secrecy demanded in [9]). 
Thus, the security problem definition remains as proposed above on page 8 at the beginning 
of this section. 
Feasibility consideration. In general, it is not possible to prevent the reading on the network 
even sniffing and data decryption are punishable according to § 202aStGB in Germany and 
corresponding laws in other countries. The intruder works in the following way. He sniffs all 
voting protocol messages transmitted to the voting server, stores these data in a database and 
analyses them later. These messages are encrypted with state-of-the-art encryption algorithms 
which are classified as secure. The problem with respect to the security objective 
O.ElecSecrecyNet is that the chosen algorithms might be classified as secure for the present 
and possibly also for the near future, but no statements for the long future can be made. 
Perhaps, someone will find a fast algorithm to decrypt messages without the knowledge of the 
secret key, allowing to break the applied cryptographic algorithm. In any case, by using 
adequate computational power, single messages can be decrypted or single secret keys can be 
calculated (brute force trials). Depending on the intruder’s computational power, the intruder 
will be in a position to decrypt all or some encrypted ballot messages at some time in the 
future. Thus, it cannot be prevented that the intruder will be able to decrypt these messages at 
some time in the future. However, to ensure O.ElecSEcrecyNet [case 1] the application of 
state-of-the-art encryption algorithms would work. The question for the other two cases is, 
whether the intruder is able to link the decrypted vote message to the corresponding voter ID 
or whether he only gets decrypted vote messages but cannot link these to voters. The analysis 
of different types of remote electronic voting systems in [11] shows that temporal unlimited 
election secrecy like demanded in O.ElecSecrecyNet [case 3] cannot be ensured by any of the 
analysed remote electronic voting systems because of bindings to voter’s IP-address, or even 
more, because of the binding to the voter’s digital signature. Exceptions are those remote 
electronic voting systems that implement re-voting like in Estonia or those that implement a 
two-phase voting protocol (see, for instance, [9]). [11] also points out that, in general, there is 
no possibility to prove the knowledge to a third party, which enables the application of 
O.ElecSecrecyNet [case 2]. 
5. Conclusion 
This contribution underlines the importance of the trust model definition for any kind of 
system evaluations and in particular for evaluations of remote electronic voting systems 
according to the Common Criteria. Thereby, the trust model definition is important to decide 
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whether a particular system is compliant to the defined security requirements. Such a 
statement is not possible for the general case, but only under the conditions of the defined 
trust model. Vice versa, the evaluated system does only ensure the security requirements if the 
trust model holds for the environment the system is used in. Therefore, it is essential to base 
the evaluation on a trust model that really holds in the environment. However, changing or 
strengthening the trust model has consequences for the system design. This contribution 
shows that for some classes of trust models for remote electronic voting systems, there exists 
(currently) no possibility to develop a corresponding remote electronic voting system that is 
compliant to the security requirements under these trust models. In these cases, remote 
electronic voting systems should not be used. 
Note that it is the task of the responsible election authority to decide if the trust model 
realistically fits to the application environment. In particular, the election authority must 
respond to the two questions discussed in this contribution: how long must the election 
secrecy be ensured and how trustworthy is the vote casting device? As shown in the previous 
section, depending on their decision, the system has to provide more or less security 
functions. In one of the discussed cases a corresponding implementation is even not possible. 
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